AI Agent Authorization at the Action Boundary
AI agent authorization answers a concrete runtime question: does this agent have authority to perform this particular action, against this target, under the current policy?
Authentication is not authorization
Proving which agent sent a request is necessary, but identity alone does not grant authority. A signed identity can establish who proposed an action; authorization determines whether that identity is allowed to perform it.
For autonomous workflows, this distinction becomes critical because one agent may legitimately perform a read operation while lacking permission to write a file, restart production or trigger a financial action.
Per-action authorization
AI agent action authorization can bind authority to an agent, action type, target, tenant, policy version and time window. That makes permission more specific than a long-lived credential that implicitly authorizes every downstream action.
A useful execution path also checks freshness and replay state so previously valid authority cannot simply be reused after circumstances change.
Authorization before execution
Pre-execution authorization moves the decision close to the side effect. The proposed action is evaluated first; only a valid decision package should reach the governed executor.
Sentinel's execution boundary verifies signed governance decisions, approved action digests, expiry and replay state immediately before a governed side effect.
Revocation and fail-closed behavior
Authorization is only useful if it can be withdrawn. Agent state, tenant controls, capability changes and operational freezes must be able to stop future execution.
When required authority cannot be established, a fail-closed boundary denies the action rather than treating missing governance as permission.